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Abstract 
 
There is now substantial evidence that locational and agglomeration influences can 
have a significant positive effect on innovation performance.  Networking and 
boundary-spanning activities are also increasingly recognised as important 
contributors to innovation success. This paper attempts to discover whether these 
factors are linked: in particular, is there any link between plant location, 
agglomeration effects and the extent of outsourcing in the innovation process? Using 
data for a large sample of UK and German manufacturing plants we find that 
organisational and strategic factors play a much greater and more consistent role in 
shaping the level of outsourcing in the innovation process than locational influences. 
Strategic approaches to outsourcing may also have benefits in terms of the potential 
for plants to obtain economies of scope in the management or governance of 
outsourcing in the innovation process. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Since Davelaar and Nijkamp (1989, 1992) there has been considerable interest in the 
impact of locational factors on firms’ innovative activity. A central thesis underlying 
this research has been the idea that urban or metropolitan locations provide the most 
conducive environment for innovation due to agglomeration, information and human 
resource advantages (Oakey, 1984; Kleinknecht and Poot, 1992; Todtling, 1992). 
Shefer and Frenkel (1998), for example, in their recent work on Northern Israel, 
distinguish between the ‘metropolitan’ area of Haifa, ‘intermediate’ (i.e. suburban 
areas), and ‘peripheral’ (i.e. rural) locations. Their results suggest – that for high-tech 
businesses at least – a metropolitan or urban location does have substantial advantages 
for product innovation. Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1996), using Dutch data, also 
identified positive urban effects on some aspects on firms’ innovative activity, while 
Harris and Trainor (1995) found that firms in urban locations in Northern Ireland were 
more likely to introduce new products than those elsewhere.  
 
While these studies provide a clear indication of the potential importance of an urban 
or metropolitan location for innovation they provide little insight into the mechanisms 
through which any such effect might operate. One possibility is that firms operating in 
urban and non-urban areas might make differential use of external resources as part of 
their innovation activity. This is important because there is now substantial evidence 
linking firms’ boundary-spanning activities to enhanced innovation performance1. The 
extensive literatures on geographical clusters (e.g. Porter 1990, Baptista and Swann, 
1998), industrial districts and innovative milieux (see, for example, the discussion in 
Koschatzky, 1998, pp 387-388), suggest that geographical proximity may be 
important in the development of strong collaborative relationships in innovation, 
emphasising the spatial dimension of such boundary-spanning activity. 
 
                                                          
1 For a review of earlier studies see Freeman (1991). More recent survey-based evidence comes from 
the Netherlands (Oerlemans et al., 1998), Sweden (Karlsson, 1997), Germany and France, 
(Koschatzky, 1998) and the UK (Love and Roper, 1999; Roper et al, 2000). Other evidence of the 
positive innovation effects of firms’ networking activities come from firm or industry case study 
evidence. Gemser and Wijnberg (1995) for example consider the effect of horizontal networks among 
companies in Silicon Valley and in the Italian furniture industry, while Autio (1997) provides evidence 
for networking among new technology based firms. Contrary evidence is limited, although Gauvin 
(1995) finds no evidence of positive networking effects in a study of Canadian patents data.  
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Despite its potential importance, the outsourcing decision in the innovation process 
has received relatively little attention.  Significant exceptions are a series of papers 
focussing on the factors determining the use of internal versus external R&D (Hertog 
and Thurik, 1993; Audretsch et al., 1996; Love and Roper, 2000) and a recent paper 
by Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) focussing on Belgian firms’ choice of partners 
during the product innovation process. From a regional perspective, however, the 
Veugelers and Cassiman paper is limited as it makes no allowance for the potential 
influence of locational factors on the outsourcing decision. Veugelers and Cassiman 
also treat the innovation process as a single activity with firms facing a single 
strategic decision on external sourcing. In reality, however, the product innovation 
process comprises a number of diverse activities with very different risk-reward 
balances: product testing, for example, is a much more predictable and routine activity 
than, say, prototype development. In what follows we examine the outsourcing 
decisions of a large sample of innovative UK and German manufacturing plants. Our 
data enable us to be more specific than Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) and we focus 
on the factors affecting the outsourcing decision for seven separate activities in the 
product innovation process. In each case our primary interest is whether we can 
identify any agglomeration or locational effects on the outsourcing decision.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
theoretical literature and outlines the conceptual framework that underlies the 
empirical research.  Section 3 describes the data used and the estimation method 
adopted. Section 4 describes the empirical results and section 5 summarises the main 
empirical conclusions and suggests some directions for future research 
 
 
2. Conceptual Framework  
 
Outsourcing represents the ‘fundamental decision to reject the internalisation of an 
activity’ (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000, p. 764). As such it involves a strategic decision 
either to substitute external sourcing for internal activity or to use externally provided 
activities to extend a firm’s capabilities. Proximity between the purchaser and the 
provider of the outsourced activity may influence the outsourcing decision due to 
agglomeration or clustering effects or what the urban economics literature calls 
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localisation externalities (Dobkins, 1996). These may influence the outsourcing 
decision by: impacting on the costs of the outsourced activity; influencing the 
governance or management costs associated with outsourcing (Viming and 
Globerman, 1999); or, by changing the risks associated with information asymmetry, 
bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1975). In the particular context of 
the innovation process, where outcomes are uncertain and contracts are likely to be 
incomplete, the latter of these may be particularly important. ‘Clustering of some 
firms may, for example, facilitate outsourcing possibilities, contacts and information 
that would not be readily available with dispersion. Locating in a central area … may 
help to create and support networks of co-production or sub-contracting that can be 
vital to R&D activities, through the resource savings that they provide. Such 
outsourcing economies may be crucial to small and medium –sized enterprises, it can 
save resources … and the patterns of trust and reciprocity that can develop from co-
production may also provide for a stronger relationship between R&D and productive 
performance’ (Suarez-Villa and Rama, 1996, p. 1156).  
 
Proximity may, for example, allow firms to make savings in the transportation 
necessitated by outsourcing, particularly where clustering of similar businesses leads 
to the development of specialised transport services. Clustering may also allow gains 
to be made from specialisation, the development of specialised support services and 
technical support (Suarez-Villa and Rama, 1996). Local knowledge or interpersonal 
networks may also increase the scope for outsourcing, as may the development of 
strong local supply chains or other forms of local inter-firm networks (e.g. Morgan, 
1997). Governance or management costs may also be reduced as proximity can 
facilitate the personal contacts which motivate and support the development of trust 
(e.g. Hansen, 1990). In each case the potential for such proximity effects – or 
outsourcing economies – is likely to be greater in urbanised or metropolitan areas (e.g. 
Suarez-Villa and Karlsson, 1996; Suarez-Villa and Rama, 1996). This suggests our 
principal hypothesis, namely that plants in urbanised or metropolitan locations will be 
more likely to undertake outsourcing in the innovation process.  
 
In conjunction with this principal hypothesis we also consider a series of 
complementary issues relating to the general impact on the level of external sourcing 
of the characteristics of plants, the markets in which they operate and their strategic 
 4
choices in managing the innovation process. The first of these relates to the possibility 
of economies of scope in the management of outsourcing in the innovation process.  
Economies of scope are associated with assets which are not wholly specific and 
therefore transferable in use (Teece 1997), which may include human (i.e. knowledge) 
resources as well as physical assets.  Where the managers of a firm have acquired 
expertise in the management of external relationships in one aspect of innovation, this 
implicit knowledge is potentially transferable into other areas of the innovation 
process, suggesting that firms outsourcing in one activity are more likely to be 
outsourcing in other activities. 
 
Market conditions, particularly their impact on firms’ ability to appropriate post-
innovation returns, may also influence the advantages of undertaking innovation 
externally or in-house. Teece (1986), for example, draws a distinction between 
markets in which market structure, the nature of technology and the intellectual 
property rights (IPR) regime are such that appropriability conditions are ‘tight’ (i.e. 
leakage is limited and imitation is difficult) and situations where appropriability 
conditions are ‘weak’ (i.e. leakage is frequent and imitation is easy). Resource 
constrained firms (or in Teece’s terms firms lacking certain ‘complementary assets’) 
will be more inclined to source external assets in market situations where 
appropriability conditions are tight and where the necessary complementary assets are 
in sufficiently competitive supply to offset the potential hold-up problem of small 
numbers bargaining (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999, p. 67)2.  In situations where 
appropriability conditions are weaker, by contrast, firms may have less ability to 
protect and exploit the property rights arising from the results of their research, and 
more reason to fear the possible dissipation of rents which may result from disclosure 
of R&D findings by a research partner or subcontractor, especially where embodied 
human capital is employed (Teece, 1988). However, this will be more of an issue for 
some firms than for others.  In order to protect their favourable positions, firms in 
highly concentrated markets, especially those firms which themselves have a high 
market share, will be particularly keen to prevent or delay the imitation by rivals 
which often accompanies innovation.  One way of doing this is to carry out research 
                                                          
2 Oerlemans et al. (1998) also find evidence that the use of internal and external resources by Dutch 
companies differs significantly between the sectors as defined by Pavitt (1984), i.e. between supplier 
dominated, scale intensive, specialised suppliers and science based sectors. 
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in-house, lessening the risk of disclosure to rivals.  Hertog and Thurik (1993) also 
highlight the fact that undertaking innovation activities in-house may also give a firm 
a valuable lead-time over its rivals in a concentrated market3. The suggestion is 
therefore that markets characterised by high levels of concentration, regulatory 
barriers to innovation and an unfavourable risk/reward balance for innovation are 
likely to be associated with a low level of outsourcing in the innovation process.  
 
We turn now to plant-level factors which theory and empirical research suggests may 
affect the outsourcing decision. Plant size is an issue that has received significant 
attention (e.g. Acs and Audretsch, 1988 and 1993). Typically, it is argued that larger 
firms because of their greater financial and technological resources have material 
advantages but small firms have behavioural advantages associated with 
entrepreneurial dynamism, flexibility and responsiveness to changing market 
conditions (Rothwell and Dodgson, 1994).  Hay and Morris (1991, pp. 470-1), for 
example, identify scale of operation as one of the principal determinants of R&D 
productivity4. Economies of scale may arise from equipment indivisibilities, and from 
the ability of larger research operations to recruit more able staff.   In addition, there is 
the possibility that a large rather than a small firm may more effectively manage a 
given level of R&D expenditure. While this may appear to suggest that larger firms 
are therefore less likely to outsource elements of the innovation process than their 
smaller counterparts, Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) suggest that although larger 
firms may benefit from economies of scale in internal R&D, the improved absorptive 
capacity induced by internal R&D may also put them in a good position to benefit 
from external sourcing in R&D. This suggests that the relationship between plant size 
and external sourcing is conceptually ambiguous, and is an empirical matter. 
 
Other factors often thought to influence the cost-effectiveness of technical 
development activity are whether a plant is part of a larger group of companies and its 
nationality of ownership (Love and Ashcroft, 1999). Any advantage from group 
membership is likely to be related both to the position of the individual subsidiary 
                                                          
3 Hertog and Thurik (1993) find evidence that in Dutch manufacturing high levels of sectoral 
concentration are associated with a low relative incidence of external R&D at the firm level. A similar 
negative, albeit weak, relationship between industry concentration and external R&D is also reported 
by Audretsch et al. (1996) (see, in particular, their estimated coefficients on the concentration ratio 
terms).  
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within the group and to the strategy of the group in terms of technological 
development (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). Where there is complementarity, in either 
technological or market terms, between a subsidiary company and the rest of a group, 
access to group resources may reduce the net cost of undertaking innovation activities 
in-house. This, in turn, suggests that the opportunity to access resources within the 
group, with reduced contractual uncertainty and associated IPR difficulties, will mean 
that membership of a group of companies will be associated with lower transaction 
costs in intra-group transactions and the potential for increased internal economies of 
scale and scope, leading to a reduced likelihood of external (i.e. extra-group) sourcing 
for group plants. If, however, a subsidiary company has ‘unique technical 
capabilities’, or they are product specialists, group membership is less likely to be an 
important cost determinant (Egelhoff et al, 1998).  In addition, there is the corollary of 
the argument used earlier for plant size, that the expertise gained in managing intra-
group relationships may be a capability that can be further exploited by engaging in 
extra-group activities.  Again, the issue must be resolved empirically. 
 
Firms’ ability and willingness to innovate, and their ability to identify, access and 
manage external innovation resources, will also depend strongly on their internal 
resources and aspirations (Oerlemans et al., 1998). In-house R&D, for example, may 
assist firms to absorb new externally-generated knowledge and provide the basis for 
firms’ participation in collaborative innovation projects (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989; Gans and Stern, 1997; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Veugelers and 
Cassiman, 1999). The implicit suggestion of a complementary relationship between 
in-house R&D or technical development activity and external sourcing conflicts, 
however, with some more some recent empirical evidence. Love and Roper (2001), 
for example, provide evidence from European manufacturing plants that the intensity 
of in-house R&D and innovation networking activities are negatively related, i.e. that 
external technology sourcing is a substitute rather than a complement for in-house 
development. The possibility of either a complementary or substitute relationship 
between plants’ internal R&D activity and external sourcing again suggests that the 
matter should be left to empirical testing. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 However, Acs and Audretsch (1991, p.57) argue that “…diminishing returns to R&D are the rule.”  
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Other aspects of firms’ internal resource base may also be important in determining 
the need for external sourcing during the innovation process. Mason and Wagner 
(1994) and others, for example, have stressed the importance of high grade human 
resources for innovation: “… even those firms who have no aspirations to do more 
than adopt innovations developed elsewhere now increasingly require the services of 
highly qualified engineers and scientists in order to identify and make use of relevant 
information if they are to have any hope of staying in touch with more advanced 
competitors” (Mason and Wagner, 1994, p. 68). This suggests that plants with 
constrained human and other internal resources and more ambitious innovation 
aspirations are more likely to engage in outsourcing during the innovation process.   
 
 
3. Data and Estimation Methods 
 
The primary purpose of the empirical investigation is to examine whether there are  
locational influences on plants’ outsourcing decision in the innovation process which 
may reflect the impact of any agglomeration advantages, while allowing for market 
and plant-level effects on the outsourcing decision. More specifically, we estimate a 
logit model of the form: 
 
iiiiikiij PSMOLO   43210)Pr(  
 
where Pr(Oij) is the probability that plant i outsources activity j, Li is a vector of 
locational variables, Oik is a set of dummy variables which take value one if plant i is 
outsourcing other activities in the innovation process for j ≠ k, Mi is a vector of 
market descriptors, Si is plant size and Pi is a vector of other plant characteristics. Two 
sets of parameters are of key interest here both of which we expect to positively 
influence the probability of outsourcing: β0, which reflects the importance of 
locational factors on the outsourcing decision; and β1, which reflects potential 
economies of scope in the governance of outsourcing. Parameters β2, β3 and β4 reflect 
the impact of other conditioning variables.   
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Data for the estimation are taken from the Product Development Survey (PDS), a 
postal survey  providing comparable information on the innovation activity of 1700 
UK manufacturing plants and 1300 German businesses (see Roper et al., 1996; Love 
and Roper, 2001)5. Plants responding to the PDS provided background information on 
the plant and detailed data on their product innovation activities during the 1991-94 
period. Plants that had introduced either new or improved products over the 1991-94 
period (i.e. ‘innovators’) also responded to a question relating to whether the plant 
was undertaking any outsourcing in seven activities of the product development 
process6. These related to identifying new or improved products, prototype 
development, final product design/development, product testing and production 
engineering. Also included were related marketing initiatives, namely market research 
activity and the development of a marketing strategy for the new or improved 
products7.  
 
Table 1 summarises the proportion of innovating plants in each country outsourcing in 
each activity of the innovation process. Overall, a quarter to a third of plants were 
outsourcing in their innovation activities with significant differences evident between 
the UK and Germany for the proportion of plants outsourcing product testing and 
production engineering (Table 1, Part A). In the UK, the extent of outsourcing was 
typically above the German level, the exception being plants’ market research. In their 
analysis of Belgian innovation data, Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) found a 
significant positive link between plant size and the probability of outsourcing in the 
innovation process. In Table 1 we therefore distinguish between small plants (i.e. 
those with less than 100 employees) and larger businesses. Like Veugelers and 
Cassiman we find a tendency for outsourcing to be more common among larger plants 
for each activity with the exception of production engineering (Table 1, Parts B and 
                                                          
5 This was equivalent to a response rate of 23.7 per cent in Germany and 20.6 per cent in the UK 
(Roper et al., 1996, Table A1.1).  
6 See Roper et al. (1996), Love and Roper (2001) for a discussion of the factors that determine the 
probability of innovating using PDS data.  
7 Analysis carried out at the plant level rather than the firm level has some advantages.  Although 
strategic decisions are likely to be carried out at firm level, they are implemented at the level of the 
individual plant, and are likely to be based on the product market situation faced by those individual 
plants.  This is especially true of large multi-product enterprises. Thus a firm may choose to use an 
internal strategy at one plant and an external strategy at another in a different product division which is 
facing a quite different set of market circumstances, a subtlety which may be missed in firm-level 
analysis.   
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C). Differences in the proportion of plants outsourcing between the UK and Germany 
also proved more significant for larger plants.  
 
To isolate the potential effect of locational influences on plants’ outsourcing decision, 
multivariate techniques are appropriate. In the case considered by Veugelers and 
Cassiman (1999), i.e. a single ‘make’ or ‘buy’ decision a simple logit model was 
appropriate. If, as here, however there is more than one choice variable (i.e. one for 
each activity) estimation becomes more complex. In a bivariate context, (i.e. where 
the plant is making a choice of whether or not to involve external organisations in two 
related activities), there are four alternative outcomes and standard estimation 
methods based on analytical results are feasible (Greene, 1997). Where, as here, the 
number of choice variables becomes larger, analytical approaches have until recently 
been seen as infeasible due to the necessity to evaluate high-dimensional integrals in 
the appropriate likelihood functions (Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993; Maddala, 
1983). Recent software developments have made the estimation of multivariate Probit 
models with up to twenty choice variables feasible within standard econometric 
packages, such as Limdep. While such an approach has some advantages it also 
imposes a cost by excluding any observation for which information is missing on any 
variable. In the context of a postal survey like the PDS this proved to be a significant 
practical drawback, excluding from the estimation up to 20 per cent of cases from the 
choice equation for any individual activity of the innovation process8. On balance our 
preference is therefore for the simpler approach and in the next section we report 
single equation bivariate logit models for whether or not plants were outsourcing in 
each activity9.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 give the bivariate logit models for the UK, and Germany respectively 
for the probability that plants were outsourcing in each activity. Each equation 
includes variables designed to reflect the conditioning factors specified earlier 
                                                          
8 For example, it proved possible to include only 540 observations in a multivariate Probit model 
estimated for all seven choice variables for the UK. This compares to 555-744 in the individual logit 
equations. Results for the multivariate Probit model for the UK are available on request from the 
authors.  
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including a set of 0/1 dummy variables reflecting whether or not the plant was 
outsourcing in other elements of the product innovation process10. The equations 
reported are the results of a general-to-simple modelling procedure, with variables 
excluded from the final equations where their t-statistic was less than one. Coefficient 
values reported are marginal values calculated at variable means for both the 
continuous and dummy variables. In general terms, the Chi-square values for each 
equation suggest that the logit models are a good representation of the underlying data 
with each equation significant at the one per cent level. The overall percentage of 
correct predictions achieved by the models is in line with other similar studies (e.g. 
Love and Roper, 2001) although there is significant variation between the various 
activities. The ability of the models to identify correctly those plants outsourcing in 
their innovation activity also varied significantly, being strongest in the early and later 
parts of the innovation process, and weakest for product testing and production 
engineering11.  
 
The first group of determinants of outsourcing included in the logit models are 
locational factors intended to capture potential agglomeration effects (e.g. Shefer and 
Frenkel, 1998). Initial estimation experiments included a number of locational 
indicators including per capita GDP, regional R&D intensity and regional innovation 
intensity (see Data Appendix).  In all cases these variables were wholly insignificant 
and are therefore excluded from the estimation results reported.  Two other locational 
factors - population density and the level of government R&D spending as a 
proportion of regional GDP – did prove significant in some outsourcing activities. 
Even these variables, however, have mixed signs with government R&D intensity, for 
example, being associated with increased outsourcing in the UK in product 
identification and market research but reduced levels of outsourcing in the design of 
marketing strategy. This provides little support for our principal hypothesis that 
metropolitan or urban locations have more extensive boundary-spanning opportunities 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 In terms of the ‘make or buy’ distinction of Veugelers and Cassiman (1999), the choice considered 
here is between ‘make’ on the one hand and either ‘buy’ or ‘make and buy’ on the other.  
10 See the data appendix for variable definitions.  
11 Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) highlight an essentially similar issue in their analysis, pointing out 
that their multinomial logit model “under-predicts considerably the categories with limited frequencies: 
make only and buy only decisions. Nevertheless,” they continue “the significant coefficients in the 
model estimation are interesting for identifying which variables are important in the organisation of the 
firm’s innovation strategy” (p. 75). 
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and are thus associated with higher levels of outsourcing during the innovation 
process.  
 
Contrasting with the relative weakness of the locational influences, a notable feature 
of the estimated parameters is the strongly significant and (almost) universally 
positive signs on the set of dummy variables reflecting plants’ outsourcing in other 
activities. The implication is that plants engaging in outsourcing in, say, market 
research are also likely to be working with external partners in product identification 
etc. This provides support for the contention that significant economies of scope exist 
in the governance of outsourcing in the innovation process. One implication of this 
result is that there is a potential for ‘learning’ by firms (and their partners) about the 
best ways to manage and conduct external relationships, and the implicit boundary-
spanning knowledge transfers (Buckley and Carter, 1999; Mowery et al., 1996). 
Developing such effective co-ordination regimes or systems may help firms not only 
to overcome internal constraints on their innovation activity but also help them to 
reduce or respond more effectively to uncertainty. Co-operation may, for example, be 
important in reducing ‘primary’ uncertainty (i.e. volatility due to exogenous shocks), 
particularly where the behaviour of each partner was previously a major source of 
uncertainty for the other partner. Other advantages may arise from the development 
by partner organisations of routines designed to reduce ‘secondary’ uncertainty, i.e. 
the risk that unless there is co-operation of some form potential gains from combining 
the knowledge of each partner will be lost (Koopmans, 1957; Buckley and Carter, 
1999).  
 
The ability to generate these economies of scope in managing external relationships 
has been linked to the greater functional specificity which characterises the 
management of larger firms or plants, and larger plants’ ability to absorb new 
knowledge.  Indeed, in our data, outsourcing in the innovation process was notably 
more common among those plants with more than 100 employees (Table 1, parts B 
and C). In the logit models, dummy variables are included for plants in the 10-19, 20-
100 and 250 plus plant sizebands, with the estimated coefficients on these variables 
indicating the effect of plant size relative to plants in the 100-249 employee sizeband. 
If there is some systematic benefit of plant size in managing external relations we 
would therefore expect negative signs on the estimated coefficients for the 10-19 and 
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20-100 sizebands and positive coefficients on the dummy variables for plants in the 
250 plus sizeband. In fact, the estimated coefficients for plant size are relatively 
poorly determined and vary in sign for each plant sizeband. In the UK, for example, 
where plant size effects are stronger, outsourcing in production engineering was more 
common among smaller plants, while outsourcing market research was most common 
among plants in the 100-250 category (Table 2). Plant size effects were relatively 
weak in Germany with the strongest effects associated with market research, 
developing of plants’ marketing strategy and final product development (Table 3).  
 
In addition to plant size, previous studies have suggested a number of other plant 
specific factors that might be important in determining the extent of outsourcing. For 
example, in the logit models we include two dummy variables to indicate whether a 
plant is externally-owned and whether the plant is part of a multi-plant group.  In both 
cases where the estimated coefficients on these variables are significant they take a 
positive sign. This provides some support for the idea that group membership may 
encourage rather than discourage a higher level of outsourcing in the innovation 
process. Other plant specific indicators relate to aspects of plants’ internal resource 
base. In particular, considerable uncertainty exists a priori about the relationship 
between in-house R&D activity and outsourcing in the innovation process. For the 
UK, however, the empirical evidence is unambiguous, with significant negative 
coefficients in the equations for prototyping and final product development. The 
implication is that, for these activities at least, in-house R&D is acting as a substitute 
for outsourcing in the innovation process12.  In Germany, our data suggest that in-
house R&D also acts as a substitute for outsourcing during the prototype and final 
product development stages of the innovation process, although neither effect is 
statistically significant (Table 3). The opposite effect is observed for product testing 
by German plants, i.e. German plants in our sample with in-house R&D were more 
likely to out-source product testing than plants with no in-house R&D capability.  
 
Constrained internal resources may also necessitate that plants, particularly those in 
the smaller sizebands, source expertise externally during the innovation process. In 
the logit models we include a composite variable reflecting attitudinal barriers to 
                                                          
12 See Love and Roper (1999) for further evidence of a substitute relationship between in-house R&D 
activity and both intra and extra-group networking activity in the innovation process.  
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innovation within the firm, any lack of information for innovation and any perceived 
lack of expertise. The expectation is that where internal constraints on innovation are 
greater the plant may have more incentive for outsourcing. Plants with more 
ambitious product innovation objectives may also have more necessity to source 
additional innovation resources externally. In the logit models we reflect this in two 
further composite variables reflecting plants’ aspirations to improve the breadth and 
quality of their product ranges. None of these three variables, however, produces very 
satisfactory results with the estimated coefficients poorly defined and variable in sign. 
The weakness of these internal or aspirational factors reflects the earlier findings of 
Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) who note that “variables at the firm level relating to 
lack of opportunities, needs or information, fail to affect the sourcing decision” (p.75).  
 
One clear possibility is that these firm or plant specific factors are dominated by 
market influences on the external sourcing decision. In the logit models we attempt to 
capture the effect of plants’ market situation by including indicators related to sectoral 
R&D intensity, plants’ market share, plants’ innovation objectives and composite 
variables related to competitive, financial and regulatory barriers to innovation. R&D 
intensity is taken here to represent the extent of technological opportunity in the 
sector, i.e. the potential for achieving competitive advantage through innovation. Thus 
we expect that in high R&D intensity sectors the potential gains from innovation and 
– since boundary-spanning activities are positively linked to innovation – from 
outsourcing are greater than those in low intensity sectors. What we observe, 
however, is a more mixed pattern with high R&D intensity associated with higher 
levels of external sourcing in product identification, final product development and 
development of plants’ marketing strategy in the UK but lower levels of outsourcing 
in plants’ product testing, production engineering and market research activities 
(Table 3). Results for Germany are weaker with signs again mixed. In short, this 
suggests little clear relation between technological opportunity and the extent of 
outsourcing. Other market related variables are also weak with little evidence of any 
consistent influence from market concentration or barriers to innovation on the level 
of outsourcing.  
 
Taken together these results provide little consistent support for either locational, 
resource constrained or market structure explanations for the extent of outsourcing in 
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the innovation process. More consistency is evident between what might be 
considered organisational or strategic factors and plants’ outsourcing decisions. In 
particular, in-house R&D seems to be acting as a substitute for outsourcing in some 
activities and ownership links to other plants are also associated with an increased 
level of outsourcing. Both effects suggest that plants are  ‘managing’ their portfolios 
of external links to a greater or lesser extent alongside other strategic decisions 
relating to ownership and the development of internal competencies. The potential 
gains from this type of strategic approach are also suggested by the potential 
economies of scope, or learning, by firms in the governance of their external 
relationships.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Our modelling of the determinants of outsourcing during the innovation process 
suggests two main empirical results relating to the general determinants of the level of 
outsourcing in each activity. First, despite considerable experimentation with a range 
of indicators our analysis provides little evidence for the suggestion that locational 
factors play any very significant role in determining the level of outsourcing in the 
innovation process. In this respect our results are closer to those of Love and Roper 
(2001) and Roper (2001) than, say, Shefer and Frenkel (1998).  One caveat here is 
that the locational indicators we test for the UK and Germany relate to NUTS 2 
regions and it may be that any locational effects which are operating are more 
spatially specific (although see Roper, 2001). Secondly, our results are consistent with 
neither a resource-constrained or market-structure explanation of outsourcing. In this 
respect our results are similar to Veugelers and Cassiman (1999), although they find 
significant plant size effects which we do not identify.  
 
Organisational and strategic factors do, however, play a consistent role in shaping the 
level of outsourcing. In particular, we find some evidence of a substitution 
relationship between in-house R&D and outsourcing activity. We also find evidence 
that where a plant is a member of a larger group of companies, outsourcing is more 
common. One potential interpretation of these results is that firms are in effect 
‘managing’ their portfolio of external relationships alongside the development of in-
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house innovation competencies. Our analysis also suggests that such a strategic 
approach may have some benefits in terms of the potential for economies of scope in 
the management or governance of outsourcing in the innovation process. These 
strategic and organisational factors far outweigh any locational or agglomeration 
influences. 
 
These results contribute to our understanding of the more strategic elements of the 
make-or-buy decision in the product innovation process.  Other elements of firms’ 
innovation strategies remain largely unexplored, however. For example, how are 
collaborative partners selected and what monitoring and control mechanisms are used 
in these collaborations? How do national innovation policies, national differences in 
attitudes to the innovation risk-reward balance, and firms’ boundary-spanning 
decisions interact?  On the latter of these, some preliminary work does indicate that 
such national differences to exist, and do have an effect on product innovation 
strategies (Roper, 1997; Love, 2001); but further work, preferably employing panel 
data analysis to give some time dimension to the process, would greatly enhance our 
understanding of one crucial aspect of the product innovation process. 
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Table 1: Percentage and Rankings of Plants Involving Other Plants or Organisations in  
Elements of the Product Innovation Process 
2 UK Germany 
  % % 
A. All Manufacturing Plants    
Identifying new products 0.144 (ρ=0.704)  27.0 26.4 
Prototype development  0.034 (ρ=0.854) 30.9 28.3 
Final product development 0.130 (ρ=0.718) 26.2 25.5 
Product Testing   21.374 (ρ=0.000)*** 31.1 14.1 
Production Engineering 35.553 (ρ=0.000)*** 22.1 9.8 
Market Research 1.451 (ρ=0.228) 30.3 34.2 
Developing strategy 2.039 (ρ=0.153) 25.6 20.4 
   
   
B. Plants  Employing 100 or less   
Identifying new products 3.759 (ρ=0.053)* 21.2 24.0 
Prototype development 0.025 (ρ=0.875) 27.9 26.4 
Final product development 0.670 (ρ=0.413) 23.2 25.1 
Product Testing 13.761 (ρ=0.000)*** 30.1 13.1 
Production Engineering 27.980 (ρ=0.000)*** 24.0 10.5 
Market Research 2.285 (ρ=0.131) 24.6 32.3 
Developing strategy 0.436 (ρ=0.509) 21.6 19.0 
   
   
C. Plants Employing 100 or more   
Identifying new products 4.747 (ρ=0.029)** 42.9 35.1 
Prototype development  0.131 (ρ=0.717) 36.1 35.2 
Final product development 2.882 (ρ=0.090)* 30.2 26.9 
Product Testing  8.362 (ρ=0.004)*** 32.2 17.5 
Production Engineering 7.287 (ρ=0.007)*** 15.1 7.5 
Market Research 0.500 (ρ=0.479) 44.9 40.6 
Developing strategy 10.619 (ρ=0.001)*** 34.5 25.5 
  
Notes  
 
1. 2 tests given in table indicate the difference between Germany and the UK in the proportion of 
plants outsourcing in each element of the innovation process. *** indicates a significant difference 
at 1 percent, ** 5 per cent , *  10 per cent.  
 
2. Table relates to manufacturing plants introducing any new or improved product from 1991-94 with 
20 or more employees. Survey responses are weighted to give nationally representative results. 
Sample sizes differ between elements of innovation process due to non-response to some 
questions. Average sample sizes for parts A, B and C of the table are respectively: UK, 861, 391 
and 375; Germany 840, 395, 445.  
 
Source PDS 
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Table 2: UK Logit Models for External Activity in the Innovation Process 
 
 Product 
Identification 
Prototyping Final Product
Development
Product 
Testing 
Production 
Engineering 
Market 
Research 
Developing 
Marketing 
Strategy 
          
Constant -0.663 ** -0.581 ** -0.185  -0.703 ** -0.412 ** -0.698 ** -0.470 ** 
      
Locational Factors      
Population Density  -0.152    0.150 ** -0.069  -0.218 **  
Government R&D Spend 0.192 *   -0.065   0.225 ** -0.230 ** 
      
Other External Activity      
Product Identification  0.150 ** 0.108 **  0.088 ** 0.239 ** 0.113 ** 
Prototyping 0.102 *  0.300 **  0.151 ** -0.112 * 0.090 ** 
Final Product Development 0.162 ** 0.437 **  0.420 **    0.093 ** 
Product Testing   0.062  0.316 **  0.120 ** 0.234 **  
Production Engineering 0.155 ** 0.282 ** 0.085 * 0.228 **     
Market Research 0.249 **   0.185 **    0.523 ** 
Developing Mktg. Strategy 0.189 **     0.833 **  
Market Factors      
Medium R&D Intensity   0.053  0.065 *  -0.042 *    
High R&D Intensity 0.133 **   -0.090 *  -0.251 ** 0.110 ** 
Market Share (Log) 0.029     0.020 *   -0.031 ** 
Market Objectives 0.184      0.351 * -0.152  
Market Barriers    -0.208       
Financial Barriers -0.185  0.188 * -0.095   0.101 *    
Regulatory Barriers -0.157         
Plant Size      
10-19 Employees    0.090   0.204 ** -0.129 *  
20-100 Employees    -0.068  0.098 ** 0.158 ** -0.136 **  
250 plus Employees -0.086   0.091 *  -0.053    0.083  
Plant Specific Factors      
Externally Owned 0.105 *  0.074  -0.065  0.071 **    
Multi-plant Company 0.097 * 0.140 **   0.040    0.120 ** 
In-house R&D -0.062  -0.091 * -0.109 ** 0.058      
Internal Barriers 0.343 **   0.129      
Product Range Objectives   -0.356 ** 0.178      
Product Quality Objectives 0.164   0.204 *      
      
N 555  700 612 639 614  744  661
Log Likelihood -238.8  -291.0 -187.4 -264.5 -208.5  -252.2  -194.3
Restricted Log Likelihood -354.6  -442.5 -359.7 -381.8 -296.1  -488.5  -404.4
Equation Chi-Square 231.7  302.9 344.6 234.5 175.2  472.6  420.1
% correct total  81.3  81.6 87.4 81.4 84.4  87.4  87.3
% correct external 63.6  62.9 69.0 57.7 40.9  75.4  80.4
% correct in-house only  90.2  90.7 94.4 90.8 94.4  94.3  90.3
      
 
Notes:   Coefficients given are marginal values calculated at variable means. ** denotes coefficients 
which are significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level. Variable definitions and sources are given in the Data Annex. Full 
estimation results are available from the authors on request.  
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Table 3: German Logit Models for External Activity in the Innovation Process 
 
 Product 
Identification 
Prototyping Final Product
Development
Product 
Testing 
Production 
Engineering 
Market 
Research 
Developing 
Marketing 
Strategy 
          
Constant -0.693 ** -0.481 ** -0.464 ** -0.384 ** -0.248 ** -0.429 ** -0.356 ** 
     
Locational Factors      
Population Density    0.063  -0.055 *      
Government R&D Spend  -0.116  0.171 **      
     
Other External Activity      
Product Identification   0.224 **  0.132 ** -0.017  0.339 ** 0.122 ** 
Prototyping 0.244 **  0.223 **   0.066   
Final Product Development   0.355 **  0.221 ** 0.032 **    
Product Testing 0.221 **  0.243 **  0.034 **    
Production Engineering    0.136 ** 0.103 **  0.271 ** 0.137 ** 
Market Research 0.256 **    0.049 **   0.371 ** 
Developing Mktg. Strategy 0.233 **   -0.039  0.047 ** 0.722 **  
Market Factors      
Medium R&D Intensity 0.084 *   -0.048 *     
High R&D Intensity -0.097  0.145 ** -0.055       
Market Share (Log)    -0.016       
Market Objectives          
Market Barriers   0.281 *   0.073  0.440 **  
Financial Barriers -0.116 **        
Regulatory Barriers 0.124    0.088  0.045 *   -0.098 * 
Plant Size      
10-19 Employees -0.094   0.097 **      
20-100 Employees      0.020  -0.177 **  
250 plus Employees 0.065   0.061      -0.072 ** 
Plant Specific Factors      
Externally Owned   -0.278        
Multi-plant Company   0.158 ** 0.044  0.036   0.101 * 0.048  
In-house R&D   -0.066  -0.054  0.129 **     
Internal Barriers 0.132    -0.119  -0.063     
Product Range Objectives 0.193    -0.135  0.096 ** -0.310 *  
Product Quality Objectives  0.153   0.166 **  0.139   
      
N 615  665 676 614 612  680  757
Log Likelihood -276.5  -326.1 -224.2 -225.0 -131.0  -275.7  -248.0
Restricted Log Likelihood -386.4  -408.3 -342.1 -297.0 -168.3  -453.7  -430.0
Equation Chi-Square 219.8  164.5 235.8 144.0 74.5  356.0  365.6
% correct total  79.8  77.0 86.2 84.7 92.2  82.1  84.3
% correct external 58.1  43.6 49.3 38.8 6.3  68.1  68.6
% correct in-house only  90.2  91.6 95.7 95.4 99.5  90.9  89.7
 
Notes:   Coefficients given are marginal values calculated at variable means. ** denotes coefficients 
which are significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level. Variable definitions and sources are given in the Data Annex.  
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Data Annex 
 
Market Factors  
Medium R&D Intensity Dummy variable value 1 if plant is in Metals and 
Fabrication, (SIC92 27, 28), Mechanical Engineering, 
29, Transport Equipment, 34, 35, and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Product Development Survey. 
 
High R&D Intensity Dummy variable value 1 if plant is in chemicals, 24, 
electrical & optical equip., 30, 31, 32, 33, and 0 
otherwise. Source: Product Development Survey. 
 
Market Share (Log) Market share derived as ratio of plant employment to 
that in the 4-digit industry. Source: UNIDO database. 
  
Market Objectives Composite variable derived as mean of Likert indices 
relating to importance of matching competitors, 
increasing market share and entering new markets as 
innovation objectives. Scaled to lie between 0 
(unimportant) and 1 (very important). Source: 
Product Development Survey. 
 
Market Barriers Composite variable derived as mean of Likert indices 
relating to importance of lack of opportunities and 
lack of partners as barriers to innovation. Scaled to lie 
between 0 (unimportant) and 1 (very important). 
Source: Product Development Survey. 
 
Financial Barriers Composite variable derived as mean of Likert indices 
relating to importance of riskiness, low expected 
returns and lack of innovation finance as barriers to 
innovation. Scaled to lie between 0 (unimportant) and 
1 (very important). Source: Product Development 
Survey. 
 
Regulatory Barriers Variable derived from Likert indices relating to 
importance of regulation as barrier to innovation. 
Scaled to lie between 0 (unimportant) and 1 (very 
important). Source: Product Development Survey. 
 
Plant Size Plant employment in 1993. Source: Product 
Development Survey. 
 
 
Plant Specific Factors  
Externally Owned A dummy variable taking value 1 if the plant was 
owned outside the UK and 0 otherwise. Source: 
Product Development Survey. 
 
Multi-plant Company A dummy variable taking value 1 if the plant was 
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part of a group of companies and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Product Development Survey. 
 
In-house R&D A dummy variable taking value 1 if the plants was 
undertaking in house R&D and 0 otherwise. Source: 
Product Development Survey. 
 
Internal Barriers Composite variable derived as mean of Likert indices 
relating to importance of no information, lack of 
expertise and attitudinal barriers to innovation. 
Scaled to lie between 0 (unimportant) and 1 (very 
important). Source: Product Development Survey. 
 
Product Range Objectives Composite variable derived as mean of Likert indices 
relating to importance of replacing products, 
extending the product range and reducing product 
cost as innovation objectives. Scaled to lie between 0 
(unimportant) and 1 (very important). Source: 
Product Development Survey. 
 
Product Quality Objectives Composite variable derived as mean of Likert indices 
relating to importance of developing environmentally 
friendly products and improving product quality as 
innovation objectives. Scaled to lie between 0 
(unimportant) and 1 (very important). Source: 
Product Development Survey. 
 
 
Locational Factors  
Population Density  Population densities at the level of the NUTS 2 
regions. Source: Regional Trends, 1994, Table 2.1.  
 
Government R&D Spend Government R&D is the share of the labour force 
engaged in government R&D in 1993 in NUTS 2 
regions. Source: R&D Annual Statistics (Eurostat) 
1996, Table 15b.  
 
GDP per Capita Per capita relative to the EU average in 1991, NUTS 
2 regions. Source: Regional Trends, 29, Table 2.1, p. 
35. 
  
Regional R&D Intensity Mean percentage of workforce engaged in R&D 
1994, manufacturing plants with more than 20 
employees for NUTS 2 regions. Source: PDS. 
 
Regional Innovation 
Intensity 
Mean number of new and improved products 
introduced over 3 year period, 1991-93, 
manufacturing plants with more than 20 employees 
for NUTS 2 regions. Source: PDS. 
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